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Abstract
Background: Numerous groups, such as the tobacco industry, have deliberately altered and misrepresented
knowable facts and empirical evidence to promote an agenda, often for monetary benefit, with consequences for
environmental and public health. Previous research has explored cases individually, but none have conducted an
in-depth comparison between cases. The purpose of this study was to compile a comprehensive list of tactics used
by disparate groups and provide a framework for identifying further instances of manufactured doubt.
Methods: We examined scholarly books, peer-reviewed articles, well-researched journalism pieces, and legal
evidence related to five disparate industries and organizations selected for their destructive impacts on
environmental and public health (tobacco, coal, and sugar industries, manufacturers of the pesticide Atrazine, and
the Marshall Institute, an institute focused on climate change research, and other scientists from the era that
associated with those in the Institute). These documents provided evidence for a list of tactics used to generate
pro-industry spin and manufacture doubt about conferred harm. We then identified trends among sets of strategies
that could explain their differential use or efficacy.
Results: We recognized 28 unique tactics used to manufacture doubt. Five of these tactics were used by all five
organizations, suggesting that they are key features of manufactured doubt. The intended audience influences the
strategy used to misinform, and logical fallacies contribute to their efficacy.
Conclusions: This list of tactics can be used by others to build a case that an industry or group is deliberately
manipulating information associated with their actions or products. Improved scientific and rhetorical literacy could
be used to render them less effective, depending on the audience targeted, and ultimately allow for the protection
of both environmental health and public health more generally.
Keywords: study design, hyperbole, regulation, logical fallacy, scientific literacy, misrepresentation, Tobacco Papers

Background
The term ‘manufactured doubt’ refers to actions that deliberately alter and misrepresent knowable facts and empirical evidence to promote an agenda [1–4], often to
benefit a broader industry, specific corporation, or group
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of individuals [1, 5]. The doctored, or spun, version of
facts associated with manufactured doubt closely resembles the truth but is not easily discernible as falsehood
[6]. Like an invasive species, it proliferates faster than
the truth, spreading unchecked and able to adapt to specific constraints. Countless parties have used a suite of
techniques and strategies to obscure the harmful effects
of their work. This type of deceit can result in confusion
among audiences, thus delaying actions that threaten the
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group’s mission and giving parties undue influence in
the very systems intended to regulate them.
There are multiple examples of organizations that have
manufactured doubt, obscuring the scientific link between their work/actions and harmful effects. These include, but are not limited to, the NFL and chronic
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), manufacturers of the
insecticide DDT and wildlife destruction, pharmaceutical
companies and the addictive nature of opioids, and asbestos companies and mesothelioma [1, 4, 7, 8]. These
groups successfully spun a narrative predicated on manipulated facts, thus delaying environmental or public
health protective actions, while calling the scientific basis
for concern into question.
In a recent review, we described the deceptive actions
of five different industries or organizations, chosen for
their unique and varied contributions to the list of
methods used to manufacture doubt among diverse audiences with ultimate impacts on environmental or public health [9]. The first, Big Tobacco, is widely
considered to have “written the playbook” on manufactured doubt [1]. The tobacco industry has managed to
maintain its clientele for many decades in part due to
manufactured scientific controversy about the health effects of active and secondhand smoking [1, 2, 4, 6, 10–
13].
The other industries we examined include the coal industry, whose employees often suffer from black lung
disease [14], yet the industry has avoided awarding compensation to many affected miners by wielding disproportionate influence in the courtroom [15–19]; the sugar
industry, which distracted from its role contributing to
metabolic and cardiovascular diseases [20] by deflecting
blame toward dietary fat as a plausible alternative cause
for rising population-level chronic disease rates [21–25];
the agrochemical business, Syngenta, manufacturer of the
herbicide atrazine [26–28], which conducted personal attacks against a vocal critic of atrazine whose research revealed disruptive effects on the endocrine systems of
aquatic animals [29, 30]; and the Marshall Institute, a
conservative think tank comprised of Cold War physicists eager to maintain their proximity to government,
and associated scientists who deliberately misrepresented
information to the government to both minimize and
normalize the effects of fossil fuels on global temperatures [1, 4, 31].
The stories of these five industries and organizations
reveal an extensive variety of tactics used to manufacture
doubt within numerous organizations with impacts on
environmental health and public health. A great deal of
literature has examined these examples on a case-bycase basis, but to our knowledge, no evaluation has compared and contrasted these campaigns to identify common elements or strategies used across organizations to
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create pro-industry spin and manufacture doubt. In
addition, to our knowledge, no prior work has provided
a formal definition of manufactured doubt, though a
close relative of the term is manufactured controversy,
e.g., a controversy that is “motivated by profit or extreme
ideology to intentionally create public confusion about
an issue that is not in dispute” [32].
Here, we identify a list of tactics that were used by one
or more groups to manufacture doubt. We describe each
of these approaches and identify common trends that inform their use and efficacy. By distinguishing the
breadth of tactics used by industries that impact public
health, a definition of manufactured doubt was produced
along with a framework that can be used to identify and
characterize other instances in historical or emerging
industries.

Methods
Searching the Literature & Identifying Tactics

We previously conducted a thorough review of literature
concerning five doubt manufacturers: Big Tobacco, the
coal industry, the sugar industry, Syngenta, and the Marshall Institute and associated scientists addressing climate change in the 1980s [9]. We selected these cases
because each was already well-documented, and general
knowledge of their intended audience or unique tactics
was established within the field of environmental health.
We also intentionally included a variety of organization
types (e.g., single companies versus whole industries) to
broaden the generalizability of our analysis. We also
avoided specific companies with ongoing litigation at the
time of our evaluation. We began this current analysis
by examining the case of Big Tobacco, which may be the
most widely recognized designer of strategies intended
to obscure the harmful effects of its products (e.g. tobacco itself, active smoking, and secondhand smoking).
Starting with documents that are attributed to the Tobacco Industry (e.g., available on public databases including the University of California at San Francisco’s
Tobacco Papers [33, 34]), and continuing with scholarly
books, peer-reviewed journal articles, well-researched
journalism pieces, and primary documents [33, 34], we
searched for deceptive actions that demonstrated an attempt to falsify information, undermine facts, or spread
misinformation. Methods with documentation of active
as well as potential use by the industry were included.
As additional tactics were identified, we listed and defined them in a table. We then repeated this task iteratively for the four other cases, examining additional
scholarly resources and expanding tactic definitions to
incorporate slight differences in use between cases.
Source information is indicated in supplemental tables
and reference lists.
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Organization and analysis of tactics

After fully investigating the five examples, we identified
the strategies that were found in documents related to
all five industries/organizations. We consider these common tactics to be the most effective tools for manufacturing doubt. We also identified the intended audience
associated with each strategy. This information was organized into Venn diagrams to clearly demonstrate the
shared or separate use of various techniques across audiences and industries.
Given the extensive literature relevant to these five case
studies, we do not assume that our analysis is absolute; we
may have overlooked evidence linking one or more strategies to one of the five organizations. There are no established criteria for identifying strategies so our decisions
regarding which strategies to include, how to define them,
and which were documented for each case study were
dependent on our choice of literature and the breadth of
literature available. In addition, determining the intent behind an organization’s actions is not always possible, and
thus inferring whether an action involves willful deceit is
dependent on our interpretation of the authors’ phrasing.
We also did not conduct a systematic literature review,
which was beyond the scope of this study.

Results
We identified 28 unique strategies (Table 1) used by organizations either to combat scientific evidence and facts
(referred to in the table as Information A) or to promote
narratives that are favorable to the industry (referred to
in the table as Information B) (Table 1). Five of these
strategies were used by all five organizations (Fig. 1):
attacking study design used to produce Information A
(#1), gaining support from reputable individuals to defend Information B (#2), misrepresentation of Information A (#3), employing hyperbolic language (#8), and
influencing government agencies or laws (#21). We
argue that these five strategies are the most effective features of manufactured doubt (i.e., highly successful at
delivering a message to an intended audience) and together provide the strongest indication that an industry
is communicating manufactured rather than authentic
doubt. The absence of any of these features, however,
should not be interpreted as the failure to build a case
for manufactured doubt. See Additional File 1 for more
detailed references for each of the five cases.
Many other tactics were used by four of the five organizations that we evaluated, suggesting that they are individually effective though not consistently used to
manufacture doubt; their presence adds to the weight of
evidence that a group is manufacturing doubt. This set
of tactics also suggests that there may be aspects of the
industry, product, or intended audience, that dictate the
actions taken or not taken by a specific industry.
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Only three strategies were used by a single industry
each: the tobacco industry altered their product to make
it appear safer (#20); the tobacco industry inappropriately questioned causality (#24); and prominent climate
denialist scientists from the 80’s created straw man arguments to combat action against climate change (#25). Of
note, several strategies utilized by one or more industry
or organization rely on logical fallacies (Table 2), a wellestablished form of rhetorical manipulation.
To be effective, manufactured doubt requires that a
message, predicated on altered evidence, reach its
intended audience. We identified four different audiences that are typically targets of manufactured doubt:
the scientific/medical community, political organizations
including government officials, the lay public, and the
judicial/legal system. In our analysis of the tactics described above, we found that in many cases the intended
audience drives the process, and distinct audiences require different types of (dis)information.
We identified five strategies that can be used regardless of the intended audience (Fig. 2): gain support from
reputable individuals (#2), misrepresent data (#3), suppress incriminating information (#4), employ hyperbolic
language (#8), and blame other causes (#9). These strategies were used by at least four of the groups we examined (Fig. 1); three of them (#2, #3, and #8) were used by
all five groups, suggesting that they are especially effective because they can target all relevant audiences.
Many other strategies target only three of the audiences, but due to their nature are unlikely to be effective
at altering perceptions in the fourth audience. For example, taking advantage of scientific illiteracy and posing
as a defender of health or truth likely will not be useful
in the scientific community specifically because literacy
and objectivity are core tenets of scientific inquiry. Similarly, attacking opponents and abusing credentials are
unlikely to hold weight in the legal community because
the legal system prevents personal attacks (i.e., arguments must be predicated on law, not public opinion)
and expert witnesses can only serve after passing evaluation as an expert in their field. A few strategies are singular to an audience. For example, appealing to mass
media (#16) is aimed toward a general lay audience. Scientists, government officials, and the court system rely
on other sources of information for decision making.
Attacking study design (#1) is aimed at the scientific
community, where a basic understanding of study design
and bias are needed to understand both a paper and its
criticism.

Discussion
We have identified a list of 28 unique tactics used in five
diverse case-studies to manufacture doubt. Five of these
strategies were used by all five organizations we
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Table 1 List of Strategies Used by Five Industries/Organizations to Manufacture Doubt
Strategy

Explanation

Tobacco Coal Sugar Syngenta Marshall
Institute &
Others

1

Attack Study Design

To emphasize study design flaws in Aϕ that have only minimal
effects on outcomes. Flaws include issues related to bias,
confounding, or sample size

X

X

X

X

X

2

Gain Support from
Reputable Individuals

Recruit experts or influential people in certain fields (politicians,
industry, journals, doctors, scientists, health officials) to defend BΔ
in order to gain broader support

X

X

X

X

X

3

Misrepresent Data

Cherry-pick data, design studies to fail, or conduct meta-analyses
to dilute the work of A

X

X

X

X

X

4

Suppress Incriminating
Information

Hide information that runs counter to B

X

X

X

X

5

Contribute Misleading
Literature

Use literature published in journals or the media to deliberately
X
misinform, either pro-B, anti-A, or to distract with peripheral topics

X

X

6

Host Conferences or
Seminars

Organize conferences for scientists or relevant stakeholders to
provide a space for dissemination of only pro-B information

X

X

X

7

Avoid/Abuse PeerReview

Avoid the peer-review process to publish poor literature, publish
without revealing funding sources, use the journal name to add
weight to claims, or minimize need for peer-review among lay
audiences

X

X

8

Employ Hyperbolic or
Absolutist Language

Discuss scientific findings in absolutist terms or with hyperbole,
use buzzwords to differentiate between “strong” and “poor”
science (i.e. sound science, junk science, etc.),

X

X

X

9

Blame Other Causes

Find related, alternative causes for negative effects that are
reported or observed

X

X

X

10 Invoke Liberties/
Censorship/
Overregulation

Invoke laws to emphasize equality and rights for expression of B,
despite differences in evidence quality

X

11 Define How to Measure
Outcome/Exposure

Attempt to set guidelines for ‘proper’ measurement of exposures
or outcomes, while undermining guidelines used in A

X

12 Take Advantage of
Scientific Illiteracy
(media/individuals)

Emphasize scientific obscurity to confuse lay audiences, or
deliberately disseminate unscientific or false but digestible
information

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

13 Pose as a Defender of
Health or Truth

Represent the goals of B as health-conscious or dedicated to truth X

X

X

X

14 Obscure involvement

Ghostwrite, create shell companies, use attorney client privilege to X
hide association

X

X

15 Develop a PR Strategy

Devise methods for specifically reaching public audiences to
spread B messages

X

X

X

16 Appeal to Mass Media

Appealing to journalistic balance, developing relationships with
media personnel, preparing information for media personnel,
invoking the Fairness Doctrine

X

17 Take Advantage of
Victim’s Lack of Money/
Influence

Silence or abuse individuals by out-spending or exploiting a
power imbalance

18 Normalize Negative
Outcomes

Normalize the presence of negative effects to reduce importance
and make them seem inevitable

X

19 Impede Government
Regulation

Overwhelm governmental regulatory agencies to slow or stop
their function

X

20 Alter Product to Seem
Healthier

Make modifications to harmful product to reduce ostensible
negative effects

X

21 Influence Government/
Laws

Gain inappropriate proximity to regulatory bodies and encourage
pro-B policy

X

22 Attack Opponents
(scientifically/personally)

Conduct targeted attacks on opponents by undermining their
professional or personal reputations

23 Appeal to Emotion

Manipulate an audiences’ emotions to draw support for claims in

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Table 1 List of Strategies Used by Five Industries/Organizations to Manufacture Doubt (Continued)
Strategy

Explanation

Tobacco Coal Sugar Syngenta Marshall
Institute &
Others

the absence of facts
24 Inappropriately Question Argue that correlation does not equal causation despite the
Causality
presence of strong evidence

X

25 Make Straw Man
Arguments

Publicly refute an argument that was not made by the opposition

X

26 Abuse Credentials

Use qualifications in one discipline to assume authority in another X
discipline

X

27 Abuse Data Access
Requests

Requesting access to data in order to misrepresent and attack,
employing Shelby Amendment, Freedom of Information Act, etc..

X

X

28 Claim Slippery Slope

Illogically or falsely claiming that there will be disastrous
consequences if B ideology is not supported

X

X

ϕ
Δ

“A” refers to information generated to combat scientific evidence and facts
“B” refers to information generated to promote narratives that are favorable to the industry

examined, suggesting that they are sufficient for the protection of products, to the detriment of public health.

Fig. 1 Strategies Utilized by the Five Industries/Organizations
Examined. The placement of each strategy indicates which
organizations were documented to use or planned to use, the
indicated strategy. As indicated by the legend, strategies that are
bold and outlined are shared by all five industries/organizations;
strategies that are bold are shared by four industries/organizations;
strategies that are underlined are shared by three industries/
organizations. Strategies: #1, Attack Study Design; #2, Gain Support
from Reputable Individuals; #3, Misrepresent Data; #4, Suppress
Incriminating Information; #5, Contribute Misleading Literature; #6,
Host Conferences or Seminars; #7, Avoid/Abuse Peer-Review; #8,
Employ Hyperbolic or Absolutist Language; #9, Blame Other Causes;
#10, Invoke Liberties/Censorship/Overregulation; #11, Define How to
Measure Outcome/Exposure; #12, Take Advantage of Scientific
Illiteracy; #13, Pose as a Defender of Health or Truth; #14, Obscure
involvement; #15, Develop a PR Strategy; #16, Appeal to Mass Media;
#17, Take Advantage of Victim’s Lack of Money/Influence; #18,
Normalize Negative Outcomes; #19, Impede Government Regulation;
#20, Alter Product to Seem Healthier; #21, Influence Government/
Laws; #22, Attack Opponents; #23, Appeal to Emotion; #24,
Inappropriately Question Causality; #25, Make Straw Man Arguments;
#26, Abuse Credentials; #27, Abuse Data Access Requests; #28, Claim
Slippery Slope

Based on all information gathered herein, we have created a working definition for manufactured doubt: the
deliberate alteration and misrepresentation of knowable
facts and empirical evidence to promote an agenda,
often for financial benefit.
Many of these strategies require funds for implementation. For example, tactics such as the recruitment of reputable individuals require monetary resources as these
in-demand professionals typically expect to be compensated for their time and/or efforts; contributing to the
published literature can be costly if ghostwriters or professional scientists are hired; hosting conferences and
seminars can require funds to pay for travel costs, honoraria for reputable speakers, and venue fees; and the
use of professional firms to develop PR campaigns can
require significant funds depending on the nature of the
work. Other strategies take advantage of a victim’s lack
of money or influence, which necessarily requires vast
amounts of resources to maintain a power imbalance.
For example, the coal industry’s victims - its own employees - often have limited funds, scientific and medical
knowledge, or political and social capital.
The industries and organizations involved in all five of
the case studies we selected had both money and influence
at their disposal. The coal, sugar, and tobacco industries are
composed of multiple large companies that possess the
funds needed to purchase support and attack opponents.
Syngenta is one of the largest agrochemical companies operating worldwide. The Marshall Institute received private
funding, often from fossil fuel shell companies or think
tanks, to continue its work and held sway over governmental opinions and policies, thus it did not need to purchase
access [35]. Funding is not only a necessary component to
support many of the strategies to manufacture doubt, all
five groups also financially benefitted from their ability to
manufacture doubt. Thus, financial power is an essential
component of manufactured doubt.
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Table 2 Logical Fallacies in Strategies to Manufacture Doubt
Strategy

Logical Fallacy

2

Gain Support from Reputable Individuals Appeal to authority (ad vercundiam): saying that because an “authority” believes something, it must be
true

3

Misrepresent Data

Texas Sharpshooter: utilizing a subset of evidence that supports a theory but ignoring the full picture

9

Blame Other Causes

Questionable Cause (cum hoc ergo propter hoc): confusing correlation with causation

11 Define How to Measure Outcome/
Exposure

Definist Fallacy: redefine a term to make a position easier to argue

13 Pose as a Defender of Health or Truth

Righteousness Fallacy: using evidence of good intentions to support other claims

22 Attack Opponents

Ad hominem: by attacking the arguer instead of the argument, the argument can be dismissed

23 Appeal to Emotion

Appealing to emotion: manipulating an emotional response in place of a valid, factual, compelling
argument

25 Make Straw Man Arguments

Strawman argument: Misrepresenting an argument to make it easier to attack

26 Abuse Credentials

Use of false authority: using an expert with dubious or unrelated credentials to promote the industry’s
position

28 Claim Slippery Slope

Slippery Slope: avoiding the main argument by using extreme hypotheticals as distractions

The true reasons for the common use of five strategies
(#1, #2, #3, #8, #21) among all five case-studies is unclear, though our analysis of the intended audience provides some insight. Strategies #2, #3, and #8 target all
audiences (Fig. 2), indicating they effectively spread

Fig. 2 Audiences Targeted by the Specific Strategies Utilized to
Manufacture Doubt. The placement of each strategy indicates which
audience(s) were targeted by the indicated strategy. As noted by
the legend, strategies that are bold and outlined are used to
target all four audiences; strategies that are underlined are used to
target three of the four audiences. Strategies: #1, Attack Study
Design; #2, Gain Support from Reputable Individuals; #3,
Misrepresent Data; #4, Suppress Incriminating Information; #5,
Contribute Misleading Literature; #6, Host Conferences or Seminars;
#7, Avoid/Abuse Peer-Review; #8, Employ Hyperbolic or Absolutist
Language; #9, Blame Other Causes; #10, Invoke Liberties/Censorship/
Overregulation; #11, Define How to Measure Outcome/Exposure;
#12, Take Advantage of Scientific Illiteracy; #13, Pose as a Defender
of Health or Truth; #14, Obscure involvement; #15, Develop a PR
Strategy; #16, Appeal to Mass Media; #17, Take Advantage of Victim’s
Lack of Money/Influence; #18, Normalize Negative Outcomes; #19,
Impede Government Regulation; #20, Alter Product to Seem
Healthier; #21, Influence Government/Laws; #22, Attack Opponents;
#23, Appeal to Emotion; #24, Inappropriately Question Causality; #25,
Make Straw Man Arguments; #26, Abuse Credentials; #27, Abuse
Data Access Requests; #28, Claim Slippery Slope

(dis)information. Other strategies that target all audiences but were not universally employed in the five
case-studies (strategies #4 & #9) were documented in 4
of the 5 groups we evaluated, further supporting that a
ubiquitous audience contributes to the efficacy of an approach used to manufacture doubt. Furthermore, the absence of use of these strategies in the fifth case-study
might be attributed to lack of documentation in the literature, or there may be a specific reason why these
strategies were not effective in these specific cases.
We also found that many of the tactics used to manufacture doubt rely on logical fallacies to misrepresent information. For example, abusing credentials (#26) is a
form of appealing to a false authority; individuals with
expertise in one field are routinely recruited to support
industry actions in unrelated fields, and their reputations
as experts are exploited to promote industry’s viewpoint
to the detriment of truth and health. An illustrative example of this logical fallacy comes from disgraced physician
Andrew
Wakefield.
Wakefield
was
a
gastroenterologist who claimed to have found an association between use of the vaccine for measles, mumps
and rubella and autism in children [36]. Not only did
Wakefield lack training in virology or neurodevelopmental disorders, evidence later demonstrated that he
intended to capitalize on the anti-vaccine movement
through development and marketing of molecular diagnostic tests which he had patented [37]. He continues to
promote anti-vaccination ideology, invoking several logical fallacies including the use of slippery slope arguments, to gain personal support but with great threats to
public health [38].
In an increasingly interdisciplinary world, identifying
logical fallacies may become an essential part of scientific training. Learning to identify their use requires
“training in critical thinking and avoiding illogical
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thought patterns that often come naturally to humans”
[39]. Even well-trained scientists can perform poorly on
tests evaluating “straightforward” logical relationships
[40]. For this reason, lay audiences, who often lack formal training in critical and logical thinking, may find the
process of identifying and rejecting the logical fallacies
used to manufacture doubt particularly difficult. Logical
fallacies have been discussed in the context of numerous
and disparate scientific fields and are not always observed in the context of manufactured doubt (e.g., [41,
42]); rather, they may solely reflect the communicator’s
own logical reasoning. Thus, the presence of a logical
fallacy is insufficient to conclude that a group or individual is intending to manufacture doubt.
We believe our analysis of the tactics used by industries and organizations can also be used to answer the
question of who can manufacture doubt. Our approach
provides evidence that there are two related but distinct
parties in the doubt manufacturing process: manufacturers and perpetuators. All five of the groups we examined worked with others such as PR firms, scientists,
researchers and physicians, as well as hired “ringers”
posing as lay-people, who served as active doubt manufacturers (e.g., those who directly manipulated information, actively formulating, or employing one of the 28
listed strategies) ([43], pg 73).
In contrast, doubt perpetuators knowingly or unknowingly spread false information given to them by an original doubt manufacturer. These can include, but are
not limited to, journalists, bloggers, citizen scientists,
and lay-people that disseminate information and spread
pro-industry spin. For example, one member of the Marshall Institute found that the Wall Street Journal [44]
served as a suitable platform for circulating a pithy attack on the IPCC [3]. Scientific information can be complex, and communicating such information often
requires lengthy analysis or explanation; thus, it is often
poorly suited to popular methods of communication
which have become increasingly brief and reliant upon
common knowledge [45]. Journalists, perhaps even recognizing falsehoods, face challenges in exposing manufactured doubt to the public when it runs counter to
public ideology, and unfortunately many media platforms do not allow for in-depth analyses. As the cases
described here demonstrate, lengthy journalism pieces
that reveal a strong case of manufactured doubt can result in a paradigm shift, forcing us to reanalyze sometimes decades-old assumptions; in contrast, a short
article or two-minute news segment are likely insufficient for communicating the methods and implications
of an entire case. Despite these limitations, investigative
journalism has played an extremely important role in
uncovering instances of manufactured doubt (including
several of the case-studies described here). Resources
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such as First Draft, an international organization that
aims to train journalists and arm the public to identify
and understand disinformation, are becoming available
to aid in dissemination of complex, evidence-based
information.
The digital age has provided additional opportunities
to spread misinformation. Doubt manufacturers have
taken advantage of new media platforms, such as blogs
and social media, to unite journalists, industry representatives and ‘citizen scientists’ with the aim of recruiting
these individuals to perpetuate manipulated information
([43], pg 70), [46]. These methods of dissemination exist
in addition to print, video, and radio methods already
heavily drawn upon to spread doubt. The internet provides a unique platform for individuals and organizations
that aim to manufacture doubt, allowing them to reach
an enormous audience without investment of time or
funds. In the interest of free speech, social media platforms specifically have delayed in enacting fact-checking
policies [47], with the unintended effect of allowing disinformation to spread.
The average individual can be easily swayed to denial,
perhaps due to confirmation bias stemming from ideological, political, or religious beliefs or a lack of subjectspecific knowledge for critically examining scientific evidence. Thus, the general public may participate in
“muddying the waters” by acting as unknowing recipients and perpetuators of manufactured doubt. When
manufacturing doubt, industries capitalize on grassroots
support, encouraging citizens to take part in actions that
impede public health-promoting activities and spread
disinformation among family, friends, and relevant parties ([43], pg 71). The amount of pseudoscientific and
unfounded health-related information provided to the
public and shared by the public around the globe in our
current times, such as through social media, has only
proven the absolute danger of this phenomenon, where
misrepresented information results in lost lives [48, 49].
Of note, in the case studies we examined, governmental bodies were not doubt manufacturers; instead, outside industries influenced federal government agencies
to become unknowing doubt perpetuators. Affiliated
groups (such as the Marshall Institute) or lobbyists
working for industries provided information to federal
agencies, and, unfortunately, members of those agencies
could not always sort truth from lies. For example, the
Marshall Institute presented a report to members of the
federal government that blamed the sun for increasing
global temperatures; in this report, they selectively displayed data visualizations that supported their claims
and omitted those that ran counter [50]. The report was
well-received in the White House, where cabinet members praised its merits. A representative reported that
“policy in the federal government … is not inconsistent
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with the Marshall Institute report” [51]. There are multiple stopgaps in a democratic society that hinder the
spread of misinformation from and within all levels of
government, including bureaucratic oversight and an active free press. Access to public records and investigative
journalism can prevent governments from making financial investments and enacting policies that confuse or
harm the public (at least when the public and other
oversight bodies are also able to discern truth from falsehood). Private individuals and institutions have none of
the same oversight, and their immense number can also
inhibit widespread investigations.
Examples where government employees and elected
officials have perpetuated doubt suggest that even these
individuals with great power can fall victim to the same
scientific illiteracy and logical fallacies that influence the
general public. Further, employees in many federal agencies benefit from the “revolving door” between industries
and the agencies tasked with their regulation, leading
these employees to favor decisions that benefit industries
(i.e., their future employers) [52]. Thus, the same policies
that would impede manufactured doubt are subject to
influence from doubt manufacturers.
Of note, evidence from other cases not studied here
demonstrates that government can also be a manufacturer, not just a perpetrator, of doubt. For example, the
US federal government (and more specifically, the Department of Defense) contaminated drinking water with
perchlorate, a chemical used in missiles and rockets that
interferes with iodine uptake [53]. Studies suggest that
US regulatory agencies erred in determining the amount
of perchlorate that damages development of the fetal
brain (e.g., even very low exposures to perchlorate,
equivalent to daily intake of ~ 0.5 μg/kg/day [54], are associated with lower IQ, contrary to federal regulatory
standards) [55, 56]. In this case, the federal government
had a vested interest in producing and promoting disinformation about a public health hazard that it was responsible for creating. In other examples, Chomsky and
others argue that the US federal government has manufactured doubt, with assistance from the media, about
the true rationale and justification for conflicts and wars
the US has engaged in for several decades [57]. In both
of these examples, the federal government manipulated
the public’s knowledge about actions that led to loss of
human life, diminished human health, and other devastating effects. A governmental body acting as either a
manufacturer or perpetuator of doubt, depending on the
circumstances, risks more than just lives lost from that
one case; it also undermines any future attempts by the
government at making evidence-based decisions and
damages the public’s trust [58].
We propose that our list of 28 tactics can be used as a
tool for both identifying and countering new cases of
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manufactured doubt as they arise in emerging industries
with obvious implications for environmental health, and
public health more broadly (e.g., e-cigarettes, nanotechnology, fracking) [59–61]. Similarly, this list can be applied to documents and information obtained regarding
“old” industries as new concerns are raised (e.g., the
safety of chlorpyrifos or glyphosate, pesticides that continue to be defended by agrochemical companies [62,
63]; the over-prescription of opioids and denial of their
addictive nature by the pharmaceutical industry [64]);
and even COVID-19 (and the promotion of treatments
such as hydroxychloroquine, which research shows to be
ineffective while posing risks to patients) [65]. When an
organization alters and misrepresents empirical evidence
to promote an agenda, then a search for the use of further tactics is warranted. Evaluations of these old and
emerging industries will be limited by the availability of
documentation and other supporting evidence; the legal
discovery process has been essential to building the five
case studies we examined and building a case for manufactured doubt without such documents would be
challenging.
We note an important caveat regarding this type of
evaluation. Some of the 28 tactics we identified can be
used for legitimate purposes, so these tactics must be evaluated in a broader context. For example, public health defendants with strong evidence may err but nonetheless
choose to use hyperbole. Advocates for environmental
health issues may host one-sided conferences without the
intention to misinform; of course, there is no need for legitimate scientific organizations to invite speakers representing a non-scientific viewpoint to their conferences in
an attempt to avoid appearing biased. Additionally, anyone
is capable of unintentionally employing a logical fallacy,
and as noted above, the use of logical fallacies alone is not
evidence that a group is manufacturing doubt. Thus, expert knowledge or informed judgment must be used when
applying this analysis to other cases.
Furthermore, the use of each of these strategies alone
does not necessarily indicate deception; we suggest that
both the strength and weight of evidence must be considered. The use of a variety of strategies provides stronger evidence of an agenda to manufacture doubt.
Similarly, the use of a weightier strategy, such as suppressing information, compared to one that may be used
for non-manipulative purposes, such as hosting conferences, also provides more compelling evidence for manufactured doubt. For this reason, the 28 strategies
should not be considered to have equal weight. As new
cases are evaluated, we would expect that the five strategies that were common to the case studies we examined here (#1, #2, #3, #8, #21) would similarly be
documented; such observation is likely to provide the
most convincing evidence for manufactured doubt.
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Ultimately the responsibility for the production of disinformation, and its effects on individuals, public health,
and the loss of public trust lies with the doubt manufacturers. Until principles of scientific integrity are incorporated into the mission statements of all industries,
organizations, and government agencies, recipients of information must be better prepared to identify falsehoods. Policies must also be specifically designed by
government agencies, academic institutions, scientific
and medical societies, and other stakeholders to stop its
spread. Furthermore, the ramifications of regulatory “reform” legislation intended to stem the creation of doubt,
or the spread of doubt, should be made clear to constituents who may be unaware of its impact on evidencebased policy [66]. Defining manufactured doubt and
identifying the methods for its implementation are necessary for developing strategies to counter its effects
and prevent propagation. Manufactured doubt continues
to invade scientific, social, political, and legal spheres;
therefore, diverse audiences must develop skills to
recognize it and the methods used to generate it. Identification is a difficult task when the results of manufactured doubt inherently allow invested parties to remain
hidden. By determining the intended audience of each
strategy, we are better poised to identify specific
methods of countering their effects. There are a variety
of strategies that individuals can use to evaluate and
contextualize the information they are given, but they
differ by audience:
1) The lay public can verify sources and investigate
who is making claims by checking for conflicts of
interest. Though public health may not motivate all
individuals, and not everyone is interested in
overcoming confirmation bias, knowledge of
potential threats to personal health through
intentional deception may inspire more thorough
personal investigation. Enhanced understanding of
logical fallacies would also increase the public’s
recognition of their use. Media must also avoid
presenting evidence and industry-generated manufactured doubt or “spin” as if these two views are
equal. As shown in these cases, this kind of “balance” does not reflect truth.
2) Scientists, who have a greater understanding of the
evidence-based literature, must also identify conflicts of interest such as funding, consider the credentials of “experts”, and be wary of meta-analyses
or attacks on scientific articles by consulting original studies. Peer-reviewed journals have an obligation to require conflict of interest disclosure and
should refuse papers that are designed to mislead.
Lack of disclosure should be followed by the retraction of studies. Research funding from big
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businesses may not necessarily indicate bias, but reviewers must be trained to consider bias when a relationship is disclosed. Scientists also benefit from
positions of power within organizations (e.g., academic institutions, medical and scientific societies).
They should utilize their roles to advocate for
change within these institutions, which will help to
improve the public’s access to scientific information
[67].
3) In the legal system, there is much room for
improvement regarding equity. Policies can be
enacted that protect the rights of individuals
affected by industry’s actions (like coal miners) to
effectively defend their cases, without the influence
of a power or financial disparity. Expert testimony
must also be held to a very high standard of
impartiality.
4) The current political system has demonstrated that
funding influences regulations and policy. Though
we cannot expect all government officials to be
experts in scientific literacy, government agencies
must actively consult and act upon information
from truly impartial individuals that can provide
support and information regarding scientific and
non-scientific evidence not subject to manufactured
doubt. We can ask that the executive branch nominate qualified individuals to lead scientific agencies
and advisory boards; that federal officials face punishment for tampering with scientific reports; and
that administrations, regardless of their political
party, avoid creating hostile work environments for
scientific staff [68]. Regulatory agencies must also
acknowledge and stop the revolving door with industry and take actions to protect against biases
that are introduced by future employment
relationships.
Individuals and organizations, especially those tasked
with protecting the public’s health, must arm themselves
with knowledge of these tactics and develop or hone
protective strategies to recognize and prevent cases of
manufactured doubt. This investigation will enable
people from all spheres to assess the vast amount of information they are exposed to in the most objective way
possible and discern truth from falsehood.
Our evaluation provides a thorough, but by no means
exhaustive, list of tactics used by industries and organizations to manufacture doubt. Our list is limited by the
scope of the works cited, the documentation available,
and the current understanding of stakeholders involved
in these cases; there may have been strategies that were
used but not mentioned in the covered texts, and information regarding the covert actions taken by manufacturers may not yet be available to the public. Null
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findings may indicate a true absence of use or the limitations of publicly available documentation. We also make
no assessments of the scientific literature involved in
these cases (e.g., our intent is not to demonstrate that
tobacco itself is hazardous to health); rather we have focused this research on efforts made by organizations to
misrepresent evidence by any means and the possible repercussions of those falsified narratives.
The conclusions and definitions reached in this analysis may be specific to the groups we investigated. Our
list is also defined by the scope of the case studies selected (i.e. a specific company vs. an industry), and a
more inclusive case-study may contribute a wider range
of tactics. With more cases, an even more refined definition of manufactured doubt can be produced. Future
analyses could include instances of governmentsanctioned manufactured doubt or more recent cases.
The methods described herein, however, are integral to
understanding industry ‘spin’ and warn against the implications of as-of-yet undiscovered tactics and doubt
mongering.
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